Money makes the world go round: Shakespeare, commerce and community by Drakakis, John








Money makes the world go round: Shakespeare, commerce and community
SEDERI Yearbook, núm. 26, 2016, pp. 7-29
Spanish and Portuguese Society for English Renaissance Studies
Valladolid, España
Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=333549411001
   How to cite
   Complete issue
   More information about this article
   Journal's homepage in redalyc.org
Scientific Information System
Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal
Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative
Sederi 26 (2016: 7–29) 
 
Money makes the world go round:  
Shakespeare, commerce and community 
 
El dinero mueve el mundo:  
Shakespeare, comercio y comunidad 
 
John Drakakis 
University of Stirling, Great Britain 
 
ABSTRACT RESUMEN 
In early modern England money was of central 
importance to areas of social life that are in the 
modern world separate from the study of 
economics. The demand for liquid capital and 
the practical problems associated with the 
devising of a monetary system that was reliable 
exercised the minds of philosophers, social 
commentators, and dramatists. The template for 
discussion was laid down by Aristotle, who 
perceived financial activity as part of the larger 
community and its various modes of social 
interaction. Copernicus wrote a treatise on 
money, as had Nicholas of Oresme before him. 
But in the sixteenth century dramatists turned 
their attention to what we would call 
“economics” and its impact on social life. Writers 
such as Thomas Lupton, Christopher Marlowe, 
Ben Jonson, and Shakespeare all dealt with 
related issues of material greed, usury, 
hospitality and friendship and the ways in which 
they transformed, and were transformed by 
particular kinds of social and economic practice. 
These concerns fed into the investigation of 
different kinds of society, particularly turning 
their attention to their strengths and weaknesses, 
and in the case of dramatists providing 
imaginative accounts of the kinds of life that 
these innovations produced. 
En la Inglaterra de principios de la Edad Moderna 
el dinero era de una importancia central en áreas de 
la vida social que en el mundo moderno no están 
incluidas dentro del estudio de la economía. La 
demanda de capital líquido y los problemas 
prácticos asociados con la creación de un sistema 
monetario fiable dieron mucho que pensar a 
filósofos, comentaristas sociales y dramaturgos. El 
modelo de discusión lo propuso Aristóteles, quien 
consideraba la actividad financiera como parte de la 
comunidad y de sus varios modos de interacción 
social. Copérnico escribió un tratado sobre el 
dinero, como ya había hecho Nicolás de Oresme 
antes que él. Pero en el siglo XVI los dramaturgos se 
fijaron en lo que hoy llamaríamos “economía” y en 
su impacto en la vida social. Escritores como 
Thomas Lupton, Christopher Marlowe, Ben 
Johnson y Shakespeare trataron asuntos 
relacionados con la avaricia, la usura, la 
hospitalidad y la amistad, y las maneras en las que 
estos elementos transformaron y fueron 
transformados por diferentes tipos de prácticas 
sociales y económicas. Estos intereses alimentaron 
la investigación de diferentes tipos de sociedad, 
centrándose en particular en sus fortalezas y 
debilidades, y en el caso de los dramaturgos 
aportando narraciones muy imaginativas de los 
tipos de vida que surgieron de estas innovaciones. 
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1. The importance of Money 
In an anecdote that Peter Laslett recounts in his book The World We 
Have Lost — Further Explored (1983) he relays, second-hand, the story 
of a late seventeenth century weaver, Jean Cocu, his wife and three 
daughters living in Beauvais in the parish of St. Etienne in 1693. The 
woman and three children (the youngest 9 years old) were all 
employed in spinning yarn, and the family consumed some 70 
pounds of bread per week. At 0.5 sol per pound the family lived 
well, but as manufacturing crises increased and the price of bread 
increased sevenfold, by March 1694 the weaver and two of his 
daughters had died and only the wife and one daughter remained 
alive (Laslett 1983,127–28). At the root of the problem was money 
and the family’s failure to generate enough income to buy 
commodities. We live in a secular world, and many of our economic 
practices are based on assumptions about the circulation of money 
that even at the end of the early-modern period, would have 
horrified theologians and philosophers.  
In Aristotle’s The Politics, that was published in translation in 
1598, some clear distinctions are made between the acquisition of 
commodities necessary to run a household, and what we would now 
simply call “profit,” and he links the latter to the development of a 
currency, and the growth of trade. He notes that as exchange 
becomes more systematic 
men become more experienced at discovering where and how the 
greatest profits might be made out of the exchanges. That is why 
the technique of acquiring goods is held to be concerned primarily 
with coin, and to have the function of enabling one to see where a 
great deal of money may be procured (the technique does after all 
produce wealth in the form of money): and wealth is often regarded 
as being a large quantity of coin because coin is what the 
techniques of acquiring goods and trading are concerned with. 
(Aristotle 1992, 83) 
Aristotle goes on to distinguish between a currency that is used to 
“procure the necessities of life,” and one that is used simply to 
accumulate wealth, and he gives as an example, the tale of Midas 
(now translated in the twenty first century into an advertisement for 
the confectionary “Skittles”): 
And it will often happen that a man with wealth in the form of 
coined money will not have enough to eat: and what a ridiculous 
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kind of wealth is that which even in abundance will not save you 
from dying with hunger! It is like the story told of Midas: because 
of the inordinate greed of his prayer everything that was set before 
him was turned to gold. (Aristotle 1992, 83) 
He distinguishes between two kinds of “acquisition of goods,” the 
one part of “nature” and linked directly with “household 
management,” and another kind “that is associated with trade, 
which is not productive of goods in the full sense but only through 
their exchange” (Aristotle 1992, 84).  
In the very next section, Aristotle goes on to define what we 
might call the “politics” of “household management.” Laslett’s 
anecdote concerns a weaver who was preoccupied with the 
“natural” acquisition of wealth, by generating enough money to feed 
his family at a time of the significant and prolonged rising of the 
price of bread. But the other form of acquisition (which includes the 
profit to be made from “trade” and that “depends upon exchange”  
is justly regarded with disapproval since it arises not from nature 
but from men’s gaining from each other. Very much disliked also is 
the practice of charging interest; and the  dislike is fully justified, for 
the gain arises out of currency itself. Not as a product of that for 
which currency was provided. Currency was intended to be a 
means of exchange, whereas interest represents an increase in the 
currency itself. Hence its name Tokos [offspring] for each animal 
produces its like, and interest is currency born of currency. And so 
of all types of business this is the most contrary to nature. (Aristotle 
1992, 87) 
Implicit in this form of “domestic economy” is movement, the 
making convenient of the traversing of space that is designed 
primarily to sustain life, and as Pierre Vilar observes, in historical 
terms “money proper appeared late in the day, and did so on the 
periphery of the trading system of the ancient world and not within 
great empires. Trade created money rather than money trade” (Vilar 
1976, 27). 
In a modern secular society, the movement of goods and 
commodities, and the “creation” of markets, along with the 
economic rhetoric of “growth,” is associated with a politics of 
globalisation and its discontents, but even by the end of the sixteenth 
century by which time trade had become both international and 
volatile, physical movement, and the material means (money) by 
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which it was made possible, was still required to be seen within a 
larger metaphysical context. In this connection we may note the 
cases of two men: Nicholas Oresme (ca.1320–1382), a theologian who 
became canon of Rouen in November 1362, and dean in March 1364, 
and who, at the request of Charles V, translated Aristotle’s Ethics, 
Politics and Economics, and who became Bishop of Lisieux in 
November 1377 (Oresme 1956, x). Oresme also formulated a theory 
of the earth’s diurnal rotation and, according to A.C. Crombie, “in its 
treatment of the mixture of scientific, philosophical and theological 
issues involved it foreshadowed the controversial writings of 
Galileo” (Crombie 1969, 2.89). Oresme also wrote a treatise on 
money (De Moneta ca.1355). The second is Nicholas Copernicus 
(1473–1543), the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century theologian 
and astronomer, who in addition to writing on astronomy, also 
wrote a series of treatises on the subject of “money.” Oresme’s De 
Moneta shows the clear influence of Aristotle, including the history 
of money, emphasising both its “artificiality” and its instrumentality: 
“an instrument artificially invented for the easier exchange of natural 
riches,” but also its utility in that it “is very useful to the civil 
community, and convenient, or rather, necessary, to the business of 
the state, as Aristotle proves in the fifth book of the Ethics” (Oresme 
1956, 4–5). He then cites a couplet from Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Book 1 
in which an historical context is provided for the evolution and 
acquisition of “gold”: 
Not onely corne and other fruites, for sustenance and for store, 
Were now exacted of the Earth: but eft they gan to digge, 
And in the bowels of the ground unsaciably to rigge, 
For Riches coucht and hidden deepe, in places nere to Hell, 
The spurres and stirrers unto vice, and foes to doing well. 
Then hurtfull yron came abrode, then came forth yellow golde, 
More hurtfull then yron farre, then came forth battle bolde, 
That feights with bothe, and shakes his sword in cruell bloody 
hand. (Ovid 1965, 7) 
The context is also a moral context, and it was commonplace by the 
end of the sixteenth century to locate an ambivalence at the heart of 
“Nature” that we would now identify as the very beginning of the 
transition from commodity exchange to the evolution of “capital” 
(Marx 1981, 3.473–74ff.). In Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, for 
example, Friar Lawrence observes that Nature’s gifts are relative 
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rather than absolute, depending upon the human use to which they 
are put: 
O, mickle is the powerful grace that lies 
In plants, herbs, stones and their true qualities, 
For naught so vile that on the earth doth live 
But to the earth some special good doth give, 
Nor ought so good but, strained from that fair use, 
Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse. 
Virtue itself turns vice being misapplied, 
And vice sometimes by action dignified. (Romeo and Juliet 2.3.11–18) 
Oresme goes on to discuss the “material” of money, and in particular 
the practical usefulness of “coins,” their value, and who authorises 
them. He resists the use of “alloy” to make gold coins more robust, 
concluding that “nor can it honestly be done, nor has it been done in 
any well-governed community” (Oresme 1956, 8). Moreover, while 
rulers could authorise the coining of money as the protectors of 
states, money itself belonged “to the community and to individuals” 
(Oresme 1956, 11). The treatise goes on to cover questions of the 
intrinsic value of coins, the consequences of what we would now call 
“devaluation,” “reflation” and “inflation,” but all this within a clear 
moral economy in which, pace Aristotle, “natural” processes should 
be allowed to yield “interest,” but “it is monstrous and unnatural 
that an unfruitful thing should bear, that a thing specifically sterile, 
such as money, should be fruit and multiply of itself” (Oresme 1956, 
25). What we would now call mechanisms of the “exchange rate” 
and the profit such exchange might produce, in other words 
“capital,” was regarded as “worse than usury” (Oresme 1956, 27). 
The point is that any alterations in currency and in economic practice 
could result in a number of ways in an undue impoverishment of the 
community through forms of alienation and exclusion. Oresme takes 
up Aristotle’s abiding image of the state as a “body” when he says 
that: 
As, therefore, the body is disordered when the humours flow too 
freely into one member of it, so that the member is often thus 
inflamed and overgrown while the others are withered and 
shrunken and the body’s due proportions are destroyed and its life 
shortened; so also in a commonwealth or kingdom when riches are 
unduly attracted by one part of it. For a commonwealth or kingdom 
whose princes, as compared, with their subjects, increase beyond 
measure in wealth, power and position, is as it were a monster, like 
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a man whose head is so large and heavy  that the rest of his body is 
too weak to support it. (Aristotle 1992, 44) 
Copernicus begins his discussion of money by enumerating four 
“scourges” that “debilitate kingdoms, principalities, and republics,” 
and they are: “dissention, mortality, barren soil, and debasement of 
the currency.” He notes that the first three are obvious, but “the 
fourth, which concerns money, is taken into account by few persons 
and only the most perspicacious. For it undermines states. Not by a 
single attack all at once, but gradually and in a certain covert 
manner” (Copernicus 1985, 176). For Copernicus “money is, as it 
were, a common measure of values,” but devaluation could occur as 
a result of debasing coinage, and that would lead to the ending both 
of “imports and foreign trade,” and will prevent merchants from 
buying “foreign merchandise in foreign lands with the same money” 
(Copernicus 1985, 190–91). He argues that “sound money” benefits 
“not only the state but also themselves [merchants] and every class 
of people” (Copernicus 1985, 191). Copernicus’s point is that the 
entire social order and interaction with the wider world through 
trade and commerce, rests upon “sound money.” That soundness 
depended upon “intrinsic” value where “value” itself was fully 
represented in the coinage, and the substances from which coins 
were made. As Marc Shell has pointed out, what began as a direct 
correlation between “face value (intellectual currency) and 
substantial value (material currency)” gradually became eroded as 
the process of symbolisation accelerated (Shell 1982, 1). It would not 
be difficult to chart the shift from the “just price” of a commodity to 
the concept of “market value” that would move exchange further 
away from what was assumed to be a relation of equivalence. But 
Shell’s argument offers a more subtle distinction that depends upon 
the very process of symbolisation that brought an instrument of 
exchange, money, directly into contact with the organisation of 
language itself: 
Money, which refers to a system of tropes, is also an “internal” 
participant in the logical or semiological organisation of language, 
which itself refers to a system of tropes. Whether or not a writer 
mentioned money or was aware of its potentially  subversive role in 
his thinking, the new forms of metaphorization or exchanges of 
meaning that accompanied the new forms of economic 
symbolisation and production were changing the meaning of 
meaning. (Shell 1982, 3–4) 
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We would not need to look beyond the commercialisation of Higher 
Education in the Western world for a modern example of this 
process and its capacity to radically transform discourses, 
professional practices and lives.  
 
2. From money to morality 
In The Ethics Aristotle is clear about the link between money and 
“liberality.” Under the headings of “Other Moral Virtues” and 
“Liberality: the right attitude towards money,” he notes that it is 
“more the mark of the liberal man to give to the right people than to 
receive from the right people, or not to receive from the wrong 
people; because virtue consists more in doing good than in receiving 
it, and more in doing fine actions than in refraining from disgraceful 
ones.” There is no denying the “usefulness” of money, but Aristotle 
notes that “things that have a use can be used both well and badly” 
(Aristotle 1977, 143). These will be crucial distinctions, and will 
extend to the notion of “friendship,” whether in the Venice of 
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice and Othello, or in the Greece of 
Timon of Athens.  
The combination of an Aristotelian account of money and human 
psychology augmented with the Christian parable of “Dives and 
Lazarus,” (St. Luke 16: 19–31) is what informs Thomas Lupton’s 
moral interlude All for Money (1577). The Prologue begins with the 
quasi-Aristotelian question: “What good gift of God but may be 
misused?” (Lupton 1969, 421). It proceeds from there to offer a 
dynamic genealogy of interactive abstractions. The trio of Theology, 
Science and Art set the scene, followed by a declension beginning 
with Money, and followed by Adulation, Pleasure, Mischievous 
Help, Sin, Damnation, and finally, Satan who is attended by the 
specific sins of Gluttony and Pride. Some of these categories are 
further subdivided into Learning-With Money, Learning-Without-
Money and Neither-Money-Nor-Learning. At the root of all this 
activity is Money who is so busy coping with the acquisitive energy 
that he provokes, that he is forced to enlist the help of Sin: 
I was never so weary since the hour I was born! 
There is none at all but do crave me, even and morn. 
I never rest, night nor day. 
I am ever busy when everyone doth play. 
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Few blind matters but I must be at their daying; 
If I speak the word it is done without praying. 
Since I was here last, I swear by this light, 
I have made many a crooked matter straight. (All for Money 810–17) 
In his book Symbolic Economies after Marx and Freud (1990), Jean-
Joseph Goux identifies some of these basic connections historically as 
features of what he calls “the ancient mode of production” that 
manifested itself in the Hellenic Age: 
The solidarity of money and the deity, which we can logically 
interpret with the dialectical genesis of social exchanges by which 
money becomes the universal equivalent of commodities and God 
the universal equivalent of subjects — with the same value of 
unification and transcendence attributed to both — will continue to 
be manifest in the Hellenic age. (Goux 1990, 91) 
In a Christian moral economy the accumulation of wealth and the 
criminality that it generates, the resultant social tensions, the 
acceleration of international trade, and the renewed emphasis upon 
the symbolic significance of “money” as a commodity in itself, 
existed side-by-side, and were beginning to destabilise society at 
every level. Lupton’s moral interlude demonstrates, through a series 
of conceptually differentiated abstractions, the destructive 
consequences of the convergence of “tangible forms of writing, 
aesthetic production, social organisation of space” and also “forms of 
knowledge and consciousness.” It exposes “the economic mode of 
symbolising which obtains in material exchanges and in relations of 
production linking social subjects, that is, the mode of exchange in the 
sense inclusive of interaction” (Goux 1990, 88). We might, perhaps, 
express Lupton’s achievement as an inversion of tradition as 
“realised morality,” of what Pierre Bourdieu identifies from an 
ethnographical point of view as: 
The reconciliation of subjective demand and objective (i.e. 
collective) necessity which grounds the belief of a whole group in 
what the group believes, i.e. in the group: a reflexive return to the 
principles of the operations of objectification, practises and 
discourses, is prevented by the very reinforcement which these 
productions continuously draw from a world of objectifications 
produced in accordance with the same subjective principles. 
(Bourdieu 1987, 164) 
What “Money” disrupts is precisely what holds the subjective and 
the objective world together, elements and “taxonomies” that are the 
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“misrecognizable” representations of “the real divisions of the social 
order,” but that “contribute to the reproduction of that order by 
producing objectively orchestrated practices adjusted to those 
divisions” (Bourdieu 1987, 163). In this context the “Dives and 
Lazarus” parable hinges upon a double refusal of “exchange” 
expressed here as “charity,” and that occludes a constitutive social 
division, manifest in Dives’ initial refusal to offer help to the beggar 
Lazarus, and secondly by the consequential proscription that 
prevents Lazarus from offering succour, from his place after death in 
Abraham’s bosom, to Dives languishing in the fires of Hell: 
23. And being in hell in torments, when he had lifted up his eyes, 
he seeth Abraham afarre off, and Lazarus in his bosome: 
24. And he cried, and saide, father Abraham, haue mercie on me, 
and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, 
and coole my tongue, for I am tormented in this flame. 
25. But Abraham saide, Sonne, remember that thou in thy  life time 
receivedst thy pleasure, and like wise Lazarus paines, but now he is 
comforted, and thou art tormented. (Luke 16:19–31 [Bible 1595, 
483])  
The “orchestrated practice” that Dives violates is a refusal to act 
charitably in the interests of someone less fortunate than himself. But 
more than that, it fails to acknowledge that the material world is 
transitory, and that an adjustment to its earthly inequalities will be 
made in another life and according to a principle of divine “justice.”  
Lupton’s moral interlude acknowledges this fundamental sense 
of “divine justice,” but focuses more directly on a demystification of 
those “misrecognizable” elements of the social order that “money” 
has now replaced. A natural order, predicated upon a recognition of 
social hierarchy, is replaced by a primum mobile that in purely 
Aristotelian terms is “sterile.” In Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta it is 
“The wind that bloweth all the world besides,|Desire of gold” 
(3.5.3–4) and it is geographically located in “the Western Ind.”  
Lupton’s play is concerned to uphold a morality under threat, 
whereas in The Jew of Malta Marlowe advances a “new” psychology 
that is also an exercise in political theory. While the Jew Barabas is 
concerned to accumulate wealth, he is initially more subtle in the 




And since by wrong thou got’st authority, 
Maintain it bravely by firm policy, 
At least unprofitably lose it not: 
For he that liveth in authority 
And neither gets him friends, nor fills his bags, 
Lives like the ass that Aesop speaketh of, 
That labours with a load of bread and wine, 
And leaves it off to snap at thistle tops. (The Jew of Malta 5.2.35–42) 
Lupton’s interlude exposes the moral and economic workings of the 
engine-house of a society substantially given over to the pursuit of 
mammon. It exposes the dual nature of “money” within a moral 
economy, but it is critical from a moral and ethical (quasi-
Aristotelian) standpoint of the danger of committing to an object that 
is derived from “nature” but that can assume an independent 
identity and has the capacity to pervert nature’s purposes. 
Marlowe’s play identifies and isolates a source of wealth generation, 
Barabas, the Jew, but he also lays bare a political philosophy that 
claims to be universal, in that its methods affect Jew and Christian 
alike. Unlike Dives, who will never be lodged in Abraham’s bosom, 
Barabas will violate all social protocols and obligations, including 
those of his family, to protect his accumulated wealth, while at the 
same time dismissing the Christian faith in an afterlife. The double 
irony of the play is that the Christian Ferneze (who is left in control 
at the end) uses the same Machiavellian practices to undermine 
Barabas in order to acquire power and authority and to justify his 
duplicity. Moreover, Marlowe’s “characters” are not abstractions, 
although we can still detect a set of stereotypes beneath the surface 
of the drama. The exotic setting of the play in Malta, a geographical 
location at the centre of international trade, represents a 
“community” embedded in an international politics that manifests 
itself in the quasi-religious conflict between Christian and Ottoman 
Turk. But in the conflict between “Damned Christian dogs, and 
Turkish infidels” (5.5.85–86) it is the demonised “Jew” onto whom 
the burden of the play’s Machiavellian politics is displaced. The fate 
of Calymath is the consequence of “A Jew’s courtesy;|For he that 
did by treason work our fall|By treason hath delivered thee to us” 
(5.5.107–10). The abstractions of Lupton find themselves transported 
in Marlowe and in Shakespeare into a recognisable “reality” in 
which an “afterlife” is reconfigured as an historical “future.”  
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One more issue needs to be taken into consideration here, and 
this is connected at one extreme to the practical question noted by 
Oresme and Copernicus of maintaining the intrinsic value of 
currency: the “abuse of counterfeiting, clipping and tampering with 
money” that “has not stopped to this very day” (Copernicus 1985, 
188–89) with its ramifications for trading practice. At the other 
extreme, quantitative, or “economic exchange value” that was the 
basis upon which “the sequential logic of value forms could be 
reconstructed almost axiomatically,” as Jean-Joseph Goux puts it, 
“also provided a scheme for the constitution of qualitative values.” 
In other words, the differential mechanisms whereby economic value 
was established, could be extended to those areas of “culture” that 
were not, strictly speaking “economic” (Goux 1990, 3). 
One obvious example might be Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida 
(ca.1602) where the question of “value” determines the progress of 
the war between Greece and Troy. In Act 2 scene 2 the Trojan camp 
debate the “value” of Helen, and Hector asserts that “she is not 
worth what she doth cost|The holding”; this prompts a question 
from the high-minded Troilus: “What’s aught but as ‘tis valued?” 
(2.2.51–52) Hector challenges Troilus’s relativism in the following 
manner: 
But value dwells not in particular will; 
It holds his estimate and dignity 
As well wherein ‘tis precious of itself 
As in the prizer. ‘Tis mad idolatry 
To make the service greater than the god; 
And the will dotes that is inclinable 
To what infectiously itself affects, 
Without some image of th’affected merit. (Troilus and Cressida 
2.2.53–60) 
Paris, the abductor of Helen wishes to transform the act of abduction 
by revaluing his act: “I would have the soil of her fair rape | Wiped 
off in honourable keeping her” (2.2.148–49). Hector, for his part, 
views Paris’s “reasons” as “the hot passion of distempered blood” 
(169), and proceeds to invoke “a law in each well-ordered nation|To 
curb those raging appetites that are|Most disobedient and 
refractory” (2.2.180–82). In the scene immediately following a third 
valuation of the war is proposed, this time by the scabrous Thersites:  
Drakakis 
 18
After this, the vengeance on the whole camp! Or rather, the 
Neapolitan bone-ache! For that, methinks, is the curse dependent 
on those that war for a placket. (Troilus and Cressida 2.3.16–19)   
The persistent “valuation”/devaluation/revaluation of Helen 
reduces everything to the contingent practices of an a-historic 
present embedded at the heart of an “historic” event. To this extent, 
the gradual emptying of all value in the breaking of vows, leading to 
the discrepancy between referent and object, renders meaning itself 
ineffectual, with the result that at the level of form the play can have 
no teleological objective, or indeed, no “ending.” At one extreme 
quasi-monetary worth, or Helen as “commodity,” and at the other 
the abstract values of “chivalry,” with all the gradations between, 
culminates in the venal and venereal perspective of Pandarus, the 
trader in human pulchritude whose only bequest to his audience is 
“diseases.”  
 
3. Shakespeare’s Venetian Plays  
The distance from Thomas Lupton’s All For Money to Shakespeare’s 
two Venetian plays is substantial. Venice is not an abstraction but a 
fully functioning republic, noted for what we would now call its 
“multiculturalism.” It was also noted for its mercantile activity, 
whose complexity is outlined from an “English” perspective in The 
Merchant of Venice (1597), and for its controversial acceptance of 
“strangers,” that is also the subject of Othello (1604). I have suggested 
elsewhere that these plays offer a “reading” of Venice rather than a 
realist representation of its institutions. Indeed, if you will permit me 
the vanity of quoting myself, I have argued that the ethnic variety of 
Venice, its comparative economic freedoms, and its alleged sexual 
permissiveness, “entered the Elizabethan (and early Jacobean) 
popular imagination and were interpreted according to the demands 
of an ideology struggling to contain its own social, political and 
economic contradictions” (Drakakis 2010, 6). The anchoring anxiety 
that lies behind both plays derives from the problems emanating 
from money as a means of exchange, but also as a signifier of 
embryonic capital, and embedded in a series of social practices that 
involve questions of identity, institutions such as marriage, and 
issues of power, authority and legitimacy that are central to the ways 
in which a community defines itself. The “reality” of Venice has been 
the subject of comments from historians, who have noted that by the 
Sederi 26 (2016) 
 19
end of the sixteenth century its international status as a centre of 
Mediterranean trade was under considerable threat and during the 
first three decades of the seventeenth century it declined (Wallerstein 
1974, 215–21). But possibly in the wake of the performance of 
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice in 1597, and its subsequent 
appearance in print in 1600, Lewis Lewkenor’s translation of 
Gasparo Contarini’s The Commonwealth and Government of Venice 
(1599), provided considerable information on the workings of a 
successful “republic,” and in particular noted its reception of 
“strangers.” If Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta could project the 
Machiavellian underbelly of economic, and political activity onto the 
figure of the Jew, then Shakespeare, in dialogue with Marlowe could 
increase the complexity of the relationship between an “outsider” 
such as Shylock, and a Christian merchant such as Antonio, both of 
whom are embedded antagonistically in a community that 
emphasised values very different from those of Sir Thomas Smith’s 
De Republica Anglorum (1572), but which shared in some measure 
what Jean-Joseph Goux, in a much larger context, would call the 
“paterialist” values that Shakespeare ascribes to the Venice of both 
plays. We might perhaps dwell on Goux’s definition for a moment, 
since it may help us to understand a little more clearly, these plays’ 
paternalism, and their sexual content, as well as their dramatic form. 
Goux returns to Aristotle, and to the claim that “in Aristotle the 
opposition between form and matter is of sexual extraction,” and that 
both Plato and Aristotle aligned themselves “with an enduring 
metaphorical archaeology” that operated in the following way: 
If (paternal) form is invariant, (maternal) matter is the changing 
and relative receptacle that possesses no determinacy or 
consistency apart from the imprint of this ideal form. When value,   
or the idea, unfurls its possibilities in the hegemony of the general 
equivalent, not only the possibilities of idealism but also those of 
paterialism are deployed — even if the latter becomes increasingly 
abstract and difficult to discern. (Goux 1990, 213–17) 
The difficulties are multiplied when “money” is separated from its 
intrinsic (and “idealistic”) value, and threatens to become a free-
floating signifier, that both substitutes for the object of exchange, and 
assumes a generating power of its own, and that we are familiar 
with under the name of “capital.” At the centre of this 
transformation is the practice of usury that denotes a quasi-
capitalistic form of economic exchange, that has the capacity to 
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alienate and, from a moral perspective, to demonise its agents. Like 
the Moor, no matter how integrated or how necessary, the Jew may 
appear to be, he will always return to type in a paterialist world that 
desperately clings on to its own self-conception and the 
philosophical idealism that underpins its economic practices. Both 
“outsiders” are under-represented in reality in Elizabethan and early 
Jacobean England, but both are nonetheless the object of 
considerable social anxiety.  
 
4. Fathers and children 
In both plays the problems crystallise around “fathers,” who are the 
nominal markers of social authority, and (mainly) “daughters.” In 
The Merchant of Venice the Lord Bassanio has “disabled” his estate 
“By something showing a more swelling port |Than my faint means 
would grant continuance” (1.1.124–25). His solution is to replenish 
his coffers by marriage, and the object of his quest is Portia, “a lady 
richly left” but who is also “fair and fairer than that word,|Of 
wondrous virtues” (1.1.161–62). Antonio, his “merchant” mentor and 
surrogate father, is asked to finance the venture, but because he has 
no available liquid capital, and because he is actively invested in a 
series of trading projects of his own, he approaches a “usurer.” This 
“borrowing of money” as though it were a commodity in itself, is the 
beginning of the problem. Portia, for her part, has a dead father, but 
one who exercises power over her from beyond the grave. But the 
usurer himself is also a “father,” and of an unruly daughter who 
eventually elopes with the Christian Lorenzo. There is one other 
parent-child relationship that we are allowed to glimpse fleetingly in 
the play, and that is the Lancelet / Giobbe relationship, where the 
suffering father seeks to ensure his son’s future livelihood, within a 
traditional domestic economy of the household, and the son, 
reciprocally, is in a position to alleviate the father’s tribulations; 
Lancelet also moves, like Jessica, Shylock’s daughter, from one 
“group” to another. The fleeting reference to the tribulations of the 
Old Testament Job in this truncated comic sup-plot hints generally at 
the promise of the “son” but takes the issue no further. 
The “form” that the drama as a whole takes is that of comedy, in 
which the “power” of patriarchy is brought into alignment with the 
requirements of a younger generation, as a means of guaranteeing 
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the future of society. Bassanio overcomes the test that Portia’s dead 
father prescribes; her waiting-woman Nerissa imitates her mistress 
and marries Gratiano; and Antonio is finally united with his wealth, 
but not before he is brought almost to the point of death as a result of 
a “bond” he has entered into with Shylock who also has a “family.” 
The “usurer’s family is distinguished by its unruliness; his daughter 
Jessica elopes with his money, but her actions are legitimised by the 
enforced conversion of her father to Christianity, and Lancelet his 
servant “escapes” from one household to another. 
The play’s teleological thrust is to align mercantile success with 
patriarchal authority, while at the same time restoring the process of 
exchange to its place in a traditional hierarchy that minimises its 
threat to the community. But the presence of the usurer opens 
Pandora’s box, even though he is represented in traditional terms as 
a “necessary evil.” In this context, Venice is both a locus of anxiety, 
whose republican freedoms can be aesthetically crafted to produce a 
series of “solutions” to social problems that had already begun to 
surface in economic practices in England. The threats in the play 
come from two directions: firstly, the economic straits in which 
Bassanio finds himself generates a desire that is presented as being 
both economic and sexual; this too leads to a refinement in which he 
and Antonio share a homosocial relationship that is an extension of 
patriarchy. In this context the institution of marriage is both a 
guarantee of the supply of money and of progeny, thereby satisfying 
the Aristotelian proscription that distinguished between the 
“sterility” of money, and the virility and vitality of human 
generation. Portia is initially powerless and must submit to “the will 
of a dead father” (1.2.24), although once having fulfilled his 
demands, and when she is later disguised as the lawyer Balthazar, 
she assumes a power that allows her to expose masculine 
inconstancy. Thus even within the domestic arena of sexual politics 
there remains a tension between “romantic idealism” on the one 
hand, and the materiality of “money” on the other. At the end of the 
play Antonio’s store of wealth is replenished, almost by divine 
intervention, and he will, presumably, continue to supply the needs 
of his “friend.”  
 The case of Shylock and Jessica, however, is very different. She 
and Lancelet regard her father’s clearly puritanical household as 
“Hell,” and she plans to elope with Lorenzo. This flagrant violation 
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should give us pause for thought, and in the later play Othello it is 
even more serious. But like Portia, Jessica is empowered by her 
disguise, and engages in an act that challenges the foundation of 
patriarchal authority and the source of “meaning” itself. Who 
chooses the correct casket in the game that Portia’s father devises for 
potential suitors, chooses his meaning. Jessica robs her father of 
“meaning,” and this transforms his “merry bond” with Antonio, that 
was designed to exhibit “friendship” into something that is 
potentially deadly, and that reinforces the separation between Jew 
and Christian in Venice. If Antonio is, indeed, a “tainted wether of 
the flock” then the nature of that taint must surely, lie in his 
willingness to enter into a usurious relationship that of its very 
nature threatens to undermine the fabric of community. His is a 
mercantilism that exists on the cusp of a transformation from 
exchange value to the emergence of money as “capital.”  
No matter what Shylock does, he is pulled back into the orbit of 
Christian meaning. In his initial encounter with Antonio and 
Bassanio he seeks to make his “meaning” clear: “My meaning in 
saying he (Antonio) is a good man is to have you understand me 
that he is sufficient, yet his means are in supposition” (1.3.14–16). 
Here “meaning” is reduced to “means,” to monetary means, and 
later what will be at issue will be the “meaning” of the bond itself. 
The circulation of meaning, its susceptibility to multiple 
interpretations, is not unlike the circulation of money, and the 
problem that arises when, like language, it can circulates freely as a 
signifier of itself in a community still committed to the anchoring of 
meaning in a “paterial” discourse. The “blood” of youth, is brought 
into alignment with the free circulation of money, and both are 
regarded as dangers requiring the submission to legal and moral 
constraint. This not only requires the law to win out against the 
usurer, but it also requires conversion to Christian morality, an act 
that produces discomfort in the psyche of the “stranger” who 
hitherto admits to having only “imitated” Christian behaviour. 
Unusually in Shakespeare, this conversion also serves to legitimise 
what we might otherwise think is the anarchic behaviour of his 
daughter. That the play seems to retain some sympathy for the 
scapegoat here, Shylock, the “real” “tainted wether of the flock,” 
challenges the claim that Venice is hospitable to “strangers,” and 
that by implication, a republic, that ostensibly thrives on commercial 
activities that are deeply suspect, is not the democracy that it claims 
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to be. Indeed, in the play it is “money” that poses a threat to 
“friendship” as Antonio puts it: “when did friendship take |A breed 
of barren metal of his friend?” (1.3.128–29). Shylock responds, “Why, 
look you, how you storm.|I would be friends with you and have 
your love” (1.3.133–34). I want to return to the issue of “friendship” 
when I consider Timon of Athens. 
Alongside the question of the “sterility” of money, the question of 
miscegenation in The Merchant of Venice is caught up in a much 
larger mythological discourse surrounding the figure of the “Jew.” 
In Othello parts of the earlier play are re-worked to form a tragedy, 
where the emphasis is upon the extent to which Venice is 
“hospitable” to the figure of the “stranger” upon whom it relies for 
its defence against “the Turk.” If in the earlier play, money, and the 
processes of its circulation in Venice is the problem, in the later play 
it is the paterial authority of Venice that depends upon “strangers” 
to protect it against anarchy that is now under scrutiny. 
A minor figure in the earlier play, Morocco, becomes the tragic 
protagonist in the later play, except that this time the role of “villain” 
and “hero” are ultimately folded into the one dramatis persona. 
Whereas in earlier Shakespeare comedies elopement is a strategy 
designed simply to circumvent paternal authority which is shown to 
be at odds with youthful desire, here Desdemona’s “elopement” 
with Othello — about whose actual circumstances we are never clear 
— exposes a much deeper division within Venetian society. In what 
some critics have labelled a “domestic” tragedy, the central 
relationship that effectively destroys Brabantio’s “family” turns out 
to have its roots in a community that breeds resentment and 
paranoia, and that leads ultimately to a perverse alignment of 
“otherness” with the ideal values of the social order itself. In the 
earlier play the villain is interpellated as a “satanic” figure, and is 
made to relive subjectively the effects of the “fall” and redemption; 
in the later play two morally opposed forces play out the drama in 
the psyche of the tragic hero, faced with defending the very values 
that his own alter-ego strives to undermine. This is not a proto-
bourgeois tragedy, but a tragedy in the Aristotelian sense, in which 
the artificially constructed domestic problems of the protagonist are 
made to impinge directly on his role as defender of Venetian values. 
The defence takes place on the geographical frontier of Venice’s 
domain in Cyprus, on the border between “Christian” and “Turk,” 
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the two internalised facets of Venetian subjectivity that are combined 
in the figure of Othello himself. What in the earlier play is 
represented as a “disquiet” that is felt initially by Antonio, and that 
is subsequently bequeathed to the converted Shylock, is worked out 
more fully, and with deadly effect, in the psychology of a 
protagonist who is both “noble Moor” and potentially a “blacker 
devil.” If money and commerce make of Antonio and Shylock split 
subjects, then that process is exacerbated in the later play, to the 
point where it culminates in an extraordinary suicide that depicts a 
protagonist alienated from himself.  
We would need to go to Ben Jonson’s Volpone (1605) to explore 
the satirical implications of the practices of fraudulent acquisition in 
Venice. Here, in Othello we, as audience occupy the kind of superior 
position that we might identify as satirical, except that the discourses 
of stereotype (the denigration of the Moor as animalistic outsider, 
and the depiction of the Venetian “housewife”) are subjected to a 
serious scrutiny in which the proliferation of certain meanings are 
shown, in their alarming volatility, to have devastating 
consequences. The villainous “white devil” Iago, who is himself both 
“ensign” and “sign,” invites Othello to “read” his wife’s and Cassio’s 
behaviour, and directs him to certain conclusions that we know to be 
false. We should be careful not to displace the threat posed by Iago 
onto an assumed “naivete” of the protagonist. We see how deadly 
Iago’s method is early in the play in his manipulation of Brabantio 
and its consequences, and his narrative is plausible precisely because 
we are never told about the father’s part in fostering the relationship 
between his daughter and Othello. All we know is that Iago’s 
insinuations awaken a deep prejudice in this representative of 
Venetian law that is later transferred to, and inherited by, his son-in-
law. In what James 1 called “this artificial town” beneath its 
republican veneer, there is something diseased and fundamentally 
destructive that eats at its fabric of law and exchange from within, 
and that is initially projected onto its external enemies.  
Shakespeare’s critical treatment of Venice in these two plays is an 
“English” response to a particular kind of community whose 
imminent decay is inscribed in the very fabric of its practices of 
exchange and defence. Of course, there are issues that are reflected 
in Elizabethan and Jacobean anxieties about the complex ways in 
which new economic practices threatened to undermine the very 
Sederi 26 (2016) 
 25
fabric of community itself. If, as Benedict Anderson famously 
observed, the identity of a community is inscribed in its language, 
then the threat to meaning that money as an emergent free-floating 
signifier posed to the process of making meaning could not but 
involve those institutions upon which the values of the community 
rested. 
 
5. Timon of Athens  
The Merchant of Venice and Othello provide a comic and a tragic gloss 
on some of these issues. But it is to Timon of Athens (1605–1608) that 
we now need to turn to see how corrosive the process of material 
acquisition can become, when the values of the protagonist are 
clearly out of synchronisation with the corrupt society in which he 
finds himself. Perhaps we should think of Timon as a “Greek” play, 
with its action located in a particular kind of democracy some of 
whose values Elizabethans and early Jacobeans shared. As in the 
case of the Roman plays that select particular tracts of Ancient 
Roman history as occasion demands, so in the case of Timon, the 
focus is upon a particular kind of exploitative society dominated by 
an amoral acquisitive energy. My concern here is not with the vexed 
question of authorship, or particularly with the possibility that Timon 
is an untidy and unfinished play. Rather I want to place it within the 
context of the early seventeenth century preoccupation with 
“wealth” and its social ramifications. The Arden 3 editors, Anthony 
Dawson and Gretchen Minton who see the play as a collaborative 
effort of Shakespeare (as the senior partner) and Thomas Middleton 
(as the junior partner), invoke Aristotle’s The Politics as part of an 
argument that focuses on “the intricate network of money-getting, 
one that…is inextricably linked to the issue of economic 
reproduction” (Dawson and Minton 2008, 80). The play’s “sources” 
are various, stretching back to Lucian’s “moral interlude” Timon the 
Misanthrope, and including, Plutarch’s Lives, Painter’s Palace of 
Pleasure (1584), and possibly the anonymous play Timon (ca.1601). If 
we take these, along with Aristophanes’ play Wealth, and with moral 
interludes such as All for Money (1577), and the plethora of usury 
tracts that appeared between 1572 and 1605, we have an extended 
historical context both for the play and for the widespread anxieties 
surrounding the subject of “money” at this time. Much of these 
narratives focus upon the misanthropic Timon, that Painter dates 
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back to Plato and Aristophanes, when he remarks on “his 
marveylous nature, because hee was a man but by shape onely, in 
qualities hee was the capitall enemie of mankinde, which he 
confessed franckely utterly to abhorre and hate” (Bullough 1977, 
6.293). It is Timon’s “anti-social” and anti-communal attitude that 
attracted attention, leading to a form of “beastial” behaviour 
consequent upon his fall from prosperity into adversity. In 
Shakespeare’s play, that fall is attributed to a specific cause, that lays 
open to question the connection between “wealth,” “friendship” and 
community in the play. 
 
6. Friendship 
In book 8 of The Ethics Aristotle notes that “friendship is based on 
community” and each community is bound together by “some kind 
of justice and also some friendly feeling” (Aristotle 1977, 273; 
Montaigne 1965, 2.198). Earlier he dismisses “friendship” based on 
“utility” where the original ground for association disappears when 
the benefit derived from it ceases to exist (Aristotle 1977, 261–62). 
Reading Aristotle, in his The Politics of Friendship (1997), Derrida 
notes that: 
There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or 
alterity, but there is no democracy without the “community of 
friends”…without the calculation of majorities, without 
identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. Tragically 
irreconcilable and forever wounding. The wound itself opens with 
the necessity of having to count one’s friends, to count the others, in 
the economy of one’s own, there where every other is altogether 
other. (Derrida 1997, 22) 
The Athens of Timon is a thoroughly corrupt Jacobean polity in 
which we see, to quote Montaigne, “all those amities which are 
forged and nourished by voluptuousnesse or profit, publicke or 
private need, are thereby so much the lesse faire and generous, and 
so much the lesse true amities, in that they intermeddle other causes, 
scope, and fruit with friendship, than it selfe alone” (Montaigne 
1965, 2.196–97). The opening exchange between the Painter, the Poet 
and the Merchant encapsulates the hypocrisy of a community that 
invests heavily in the vicissitudes of “Fortune.” Both the Poet and 
the Painter can flaunt their public “moral” representations of the 
precariousness of Fortune, while at the same time fabricating a 
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“friendship” whose source of wealth is likely to fall victim to the 
very force against whom they inveigh. Painter, Poet and Merchant 
inhabit a paradoxical universe in which poetry, painting and 
diamonds, are deployed as investments, used initially as 
commodities, but also as means of extracting surplus value from 
their owners’ “friendship” with Timon. Whereas most versions of 
the Timon story castigate him for his imprudent liberality, 
Shakespeare embeds his generosity in a community that is obsessed 
with the accumulation of wealth. After an engagement with the 
misanthropic Apemantus who takes the view that “The strain of 
man’s bred out into baboon and monkey” (1.1.256–57), the Second 
Lord makes clear how surplus value is produced from Timon’s 
bounty: 
He pours it out; Plutus, the god of gold, 
Is but his steward: no meed but he repays 
Sevenfold above itself, no gift to him 
But breeds the giver a return exceeding 
All use of quittance. (Timon of Athens 1.1.283–87) 
Indeed, everyone seeks to extract surplus value from their 
“friendship” with Timon, and as a consequence, their friendship 
with him and with each other is superficial (Aristotle 1977, 269). 
Initially Timon aims to be on intimate terms with everybody, and he 
eschews ceremony as being an unnecessary accoutrement of 
“goodness”:  
Ceremony was but devised at first 
To set a gloss on faint deeds, hollow welcomes, 
Recanting goodness, sorry ere ‘tis shown. 
But where there is true friendship there needs none. (Timon of 
Athens 1.2.15–18)  
Clearly there are two distinct discourses operating here: the one an 
aristocratic open-handedness that takes pleasure in giving, and that 
can reverse the process of gift-giving: “more welcome are ye to my 
fortunes|Than my fortunes to me” (1.2.19–20); to this extent Timon’s 
affections are extended to his community of “friends” in what is 
intended to be a reciprocal a manner, suggested by Montaigne’s 
comment that “if a man urge me to tell whereof I loved him, I feele it 
cannot be expressed, but by answering; Because it was he, because it 
was my selfe” (Montaigne 1965, 1.201). But this can also lead to an 
alternative negative implication as evidenced in Montaigne’s 
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repetition of Aristotle’s sentiment: “Oh you my friends, there is no 
perfect friend” that exposes the possibility of a self-deception that lies 
at the heart of what began as a reciprocity (Montaigne 1965, 1.203). 
What binds the community together is, as Aristotle observed, the 
link between “friendship” and “justice,” because, he says, “in every 
community there is supposed to be some kind of justice and also 
some friendly feeling.” And he goes on to suggest that “it is natural 
that the claims of justice should increase with the intensity of 
friendship, since both involve the same persons and have an equal 
extension” (Aristotle 1977, 273). In Shakespeare’s play the opposing 
discourse is that of an urban commerce or, in Aristotle’s terms, 
“utility” where friendship is “impermanent” and non-reciprocal 
once circumstances change. Only the liberal Timon, who is, in a 
sense, out of time, begins by behaving in the spirit of true 
“friendship” from which he clearly derives “pleasure.” Timon’s final 
withdrawal from community coincides with his loss of “pleasure” in 
his fellow man, and a death that is equated with an irreversible and 
extreme misanthropy. Money may make the world go round, but 
divested of an accompanying moral and ethical social context it 
becomes a terminally destructive force.  
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